SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Amendment No. )
□ |
Preliminary Proxy Statement
|
□ |
Confidential, for Use of the Commission Only (as permitted by Rule 14a-6(e)(2))
|
□ |
Definitive Proxy Statement
|
⌧ |
Definitive Additional Materials
|
□ |
Soliciting Material under §240.14a-12
|
Minerals Technologies Inc.
|
(Name of Registrant as Specified in its Charter)
|
|
(Name of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if other than the Registrant)
|
|
|
|
⌧
|
No fee required.
|
|
|
Fee computed on table below per Exchange Act Rules 14a-6(i)(1) and 0-11.
|
|
|
(1)
|
Title of each class of securities to which transaction applies:
|
|
|
|
|
(2)
|
Aggregate number of securities to which transaction applies:
|
|
|
|
|
(3)
|
Per unit price or other underlying value of transaction computed pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 0-11 (set forth the amount on which the filing fee is
calculated and state how it was determined):
|
|
|
|
|
(4)
|
Proposed maximum aggregate value of transaction:
|
|
|
|
|
(5)
|
Total fee paid:
|
|
|
|
□
|
Fee paid previously with preliminary materials.
|
|
□
|
Check box if any part of the fee is offset as provided by Exchange Act Rule 0-11(a)(2) and identify the filing for which the offsetting fee was paid
previously. Identify the previous filing by registration statement number, or the Form or Schedule and the date of its filing.
|
|
|
(1)
|
Amount Previously Paid:
|
|
|
|
|
(2)
|
Form, Schedule or Registration Statement No.:
|
|
|
|
|
(3)
|
Filing Party:
|
|
|
|
|
(4)
|
Date Filed:
|
|
|
|

1)
|
Glass Lewis lists “Disconnect between pay and performance” as a negative program
feature.
|
•
|
MTI outperformed its peer group in four of the five metrics that comprise Glass Lewis’s performance measure. In fact, by the measures set forth in Glass Lewis’s proxy paper, MTI’s TSR growth was more than double that of its peer group and MTI’s EPS growth was approximately four times
that of the peer group. Yet, Glass Lewis finds that MTI’s performance was only slightly above the median of the peer group. It is unclear how Glass Lewis can make this finding given the significant outperformance by MTI on the majority of
Glass Lewis’s performance metrics.
|
•
|
The Compensation Analysis on page 9 of Glass Lewis’s proxy paper, which compares the Compensation Actually Paid to MTI’s CEO,
Mr. Dietrich, to MTI’s TSR performance, shows that CEO compensation and TSR performance are well aligned. Indeed, while MTI’s CEO Compensation Actually Paid was below the 50th percentile of MTI’s peers, the TSR performance was in
the 56th percentile over the prior 1 year, the 44th percentile over the prior 3 years, and the 69th percentile over the prior 5 years.
|
•
|
2024 was an outstanding year for MTI, marked by record operating income and earnings per share, excluding special items, and
significantly expanded margins. We also delivered strong free cash flow, improved our balance sheet strength, and continued to execute on our balanced approach to capital deployment by increasing the quarterly dividend to shareholders and
initiating a new share repurchase program. We extensively detail our 2024 operational and financial performance on pages 36-41 of our Proxy Statement.
|
2)
|
Glass Lewis lists “Shareholder disapproval” as an “Area of Focus”.
|
•
|
In 2024, we continued to extensively engage with our shareholders with respect to our compensation and corporate governance
practices. As noted on page 6 of our Proxy Statement, in 2024 we contacted shareholders that we believe held approximately 87% of our outstanding shares, and engaged with shareholders that we believe held approximately 67% of our
outstanding shares, including shareholders who voted against our say-on-pay proposal last year. We disclosed the key themes of feedback we received on page 7 of our Proxy Statement. None of the feedback we received after our annual meeting last year was directed toward additional changes to our compensation program. In fact, on the whole, the shareholders with whom we
spoke were positive about our compensation program. We believe that this positive reaction results from the numerous changes we made to our compensation program over the prior few years in response to shareholder feedback, which are
detailed on page 8 of our Proxy Statement. For this reason, we did not believe any additional changes to our compensation program were
needed following last year’s annual meeting.
|
•
|
Glass Lewis corrected the description of director Frank Feder’s status relative to MTI’s retirement age policy. In accordance
with the Board’s policy, Mr. Feder submitted his resignation to the Board upon reaching his 72nd birthday during 2023, after his renomination to the Board for an additional 3-year term. The Board determined not to accept his resignation at
such time, believing that his continuing service is valuable to MTI and requested he serve out his term. He was reelected to the Board that year for a term that expires in 2026.
|
•
|
Glass Lewis also corrected its say-on-pay analysis to remove what it termed an “erroneous concern regarding the Company’s
excessive focus on short-term performance”. For 2024, 71% of Mr. Dietrich’s compensation was long-term compensation, and 59% of the 2024 compensation of our other named executive officers was long-term compensation, as we disclose on page
43 of our Proxy Statement. We believe this provided an appropriately long-term incentive to our executives.
|
Vice President – Investor Relations
Minerals Technologies Inc.